We adapt our light Dialectica interpretation [17] to usual and light modal formulas (with universal quantification on boolean and natural variables) and prove it sound for a non-standard modal arithmetic based on Gödel's T and classical S 4 . The range of this light modal Dialectica is the usual (non-modal) classical Arithmetic in all finite types (with booleans); the propositional kernel of its domain is Boolean and not S 4 . The 'heavy' modal Dialectica interpretation is a new technique; it cannot be simulated within our previous light Dialectica. The synthesized functionals are at least as good as before; the translation process is much improved and could be more suitable for the human operators.
The present work supersedes the functional synthesis technique outlined in our previous paper [17] by adding a useful device for (homogeneously) combining the effect of previous optimizations by partly and fully uniform quantifiers in a compact discharger of constructive potential, namely the modal operator (and its weak co-modality ≡ ¬ ¬ ). Proofs which are not necessarily constructive may yet potentially contain constructive content; in order to make use of this constructive 'charge' contained in a (non-constructive) proof, various 'discharge' instruments have been created over the past decades. We will prove that is not "syntactic sugar" over the previous light Dialectica, but a genuinely new device (albeit synthesized out of previous works). We also bring the following result: while the modal propositional axioms of system S 4 are realizable, the defining axiom of S 5 is not realizable (in general) under the (light) modal Dialectica (by primitive recursive functionals of finite type).
The use and interpretation of modal operators in this paper were inspired by work of Oliva (partly joint with the first author, see [16] ) at the linear logic level, see [27, 28] . It is no coincidence that, at formula level, our interpretation of A is syntactically the same as Oliva's modified realizability interpretation of ! A in intuitionistic linear logic. However, a certain detour would be needed in order to simulate A in terms of ! A, which may be less suitable for the processing of natural proofs by human operators (see Remark 1.23 in [10] ).
The second author independently noticed the possibility of using the same supra-linear modal operators for light program extraction in [37] , see also [38] . However, the initiative of studying the full employment of for more efficient functional synthesis in the formal context of the negative fragment of first-order modal logic (cf. Schütte [33] and later discovered Prawitz [31] ) belongs to the first author. As we will see, for our extractive purposes it is useful to depart from Schütte's original semantics for quantified modal logic. For example, the propositional fragment of our first-order modal systems is not modal, but purely boolean, as p ≡ p ≡ p for propositional atoms p.
We thus design two non-standard modal arithmetics, NA m ⊂ NA m l , for functional program synthesis. The soundness of these input systems is syntactically given via our (light) modal functional interpretation by the target system, namely classical decidable-predicate Arithmetic with higher-type functionals, in a Natural Deduction presentation. 3 For an easier exposition we will give up the 'non-standard' prefix. Throughout the paper, our modal Arithmetics are non-standard (relative to the conservative extensions of S 4 due to Prawitz and Schütte) but they resulted in a natural manner relative to the Dialectica interpretation. It turns out that NA m intrinsically relates to the modally closed subset of Prawitz's C ′ S5 (cf. [31] , page 77). Note that there has been some recent attention to formalizing Quantified Modal Logic stemming from Artificial Intelligence research (cf. [12] ) and there is a dedicated whole Chapter 12 of [24] .
Arithmetical systems for light and / or modal Dialectica extraction
We build upon functional arithmetical systems NA and (the light annotated) NA l from [17] . While the verifying system NA basically is the Arithmetic Z of Berger, Buchholz and Schwichtenberg [4] in a slightly different presentation which is more suitable for light functional synthesis and features full classical logic (without strong existence) and full extensionality 4 , its light counterpart NA l is only partly classical. Moreover, the input system NA l is weakly extensional and its contraction (and hence also induction) rule is restricted for soundness of the (light) functional interpretation of NA l into NA . In computing terms, the program synthesis algorithm provided by the light Dialectica (of [17] , as inherited from the one 5 of [13] ) produces correct output only modulo the above-mentioned restrictions on Extensionality and Contraction 6 . If not for the weak extensionality, NA l were a conservative extension of NA . For (light) modal functional synthesis we will use the same verifying system NA . The simpler input system NA m is obtained by adding to a restricted variant of NA . This (weakly extensional) modal Arithmetic will be proved 3 Note that soundness of Schütte's predicate modal logics ( e.g., S ⋆ 4 ) is proved non-constructively, using models, see [33] ( cf. Chapter I , §4 ). 4 As inherited from system Z, our NA is mostly a Natural Deduction presentation of the so-called 'negative arithmetic' from [39] , basically a double-negation, Gödel-Gentzen embedding of classical into Heyting Arithmetic HA ω . 5 The restriction on extensionality is at its turn inherited from the pure Gödel's functional interpretation [1, 11] , whereas the restriction on contraction was first added by Hernest [13] , as it was imposed by the necessity of decidability of the translation of light contraction formulas. 6 These restrictions are more relaxed than those from the first author's PhD thesis and weaker than Gödel's restriction on extensionality, Kreisel's avoidance of contraction in his Modified Realizability [20] and Girard's total elimination of contraction in his original Linear Logic [10] . 2 sound via the modal Dialectica interpretation. The fully-fledged input system NA m l adds to NA m all light universal quantifiers and is a modal extension of NA l ; its soundness will be given by the light modal Dialectica interpretation. Together with our new systems NA m and NA m l we will also present the relevant details of arithmetics NA and NA l . Nonetheless for the full picture 7 we refer the reader to [17] (see also [37] for a more complete picture). We will use the same special Natural Deduction (abbreviated " ND ") presentation of our systems as in [17] , where proofs are represented as sequents Γ ⊢ B , meaning that formula B is the root of the ND tree whose leaves Γ are typed assumption variables (abbreviated "avars") a : A . Here formula A is the type of the avar a and Γ is a multiset (since there may be more leaves labeled with the same a : A , cf.
[31]-Appendix C- §2, "Variants of Gentzen-type systems").
The sets of finite types T , terms T (of Gödel's T ) , formulas F (of NA ) and F l (of NA l ) , and , with the addition of , formulas 
For simplicity we employ two basic types: integers N and booleans B , and use ρ σ τ for ( ρ ( σ τ ) ) . Building blocks for terms are the constructors for booleans [ T , F ] ( true and false, both of type B ), integers [ 0 , S ] ( zero, of type N and successor, of type N N ), T -polymorphic case distinction If and T -polymorphic Gödel recursion R . Atomic formulas at ( t B ) are decidable by definition, as they are identified with boolean terms t B . In particular, we have decidable falsity ⊥ :≡ at ( F ) and truth ⊤ :≡ at ( T ) . As usual, we abbreviate A → ⊥ by ¬ A . The partially light universal quantifiers ∀ + , ∀ − (partly computational) and ∀ ∅ (non-computational) are inherited from [17] . The universal quantifier ∀ , axiomatized as usual in Natural Deduction will have full computational content in the input systems. The weak existential quantifier ∃ is defined for formulas in all our systems as ∃ x ρ A :≡ ¬ ∀ x ρ ¬ A . The weak co-modality operator is defined for formulas in F m and F m l as A :≡ ¬ ¬ A . We use the dot-notation for formulas from [35] (see page 3), thus saving on parentheses (and further save on arrows for types). We purposefully avoid specifying types for terms insofar they can be deduced from the meta-context. In all our systems, the meta-operator FV ( · ) will return the set of free variables of its argument, which can be a term or a formula.
Term system T
Computation in our systems is expressed by means of the usual β-reduction rule (λx.t)s ֒→ t[x → s] , together with the rewrite rules defining the computational meaning of If and R :
Since this typed term system is confluent and strongly normalizing (cf. [35] ), we are free not to fix a particular evaluation strategy. For simplicity, we will assume that all terms occurring in our formal proofs automatically get into normal form, as normalization is necessary only when matching terms in formulas. We thus avoid introducing equality axioms like in [13] and skip the corresponding easy applications of extensionality. In conclusion, some computation gets to be carried out implicitly when building proofs in our systems. ( This is just MinLog's mechanism, see [34] ) Using recursion at higher types we can define any provably total function of ground arithmetic, including decidable predicates such as equality Eq B for booleans and Eq N for natural numbers:
The verifying system NA
The logical rules of system NA are presented in Table 2 , with the usual restriction on
A ] denotes the multisubset of all occurrences of a : A in the multiset of assumptions of the premise sequent of → i . Thus a : A Γ , hence a : A is no longer an assumption in the conclusion sequent of → i . In the usual tree representation of Natural Deduction proofs, this means that all the leaves labeled " a : A " get inactivated 8 . Whereas in NA alone we could have safely let all contractions be handled implicitly at → i , in relationship with the architecture of input system NA l (see Section 1.2) we are compelled to introduce for NA the contraction anti-rule C in association with the corresponding C l of NA l , see Table 4 .
We refer to contraction as "anti-rule", rather than "rule" because, despite the sequent-like representation of our calculi, in fact our formalisms are ND and in the ND directed tree the representation of explicit contractions is by convergent arrows that go in the direction which is reverse to the direction of all the other rules. ( Sequentwise though, contraction is a rule, cf. pages 90 , 91 of [31] -A- §1, §2 )
We find it convenient to introduce induction for booleans and naturals as the rules presented in Table 5 . Here we assume that the induction variables b B and respectively n N do not occur freely in Γ , nor ∆ , and that they do occur in the formula A .
The at ( · ) construction allows us to view boolean programs as decidable predicates. Given Ind B , its logical meaning is settled by the truth axiom TAx , see Table 1 . In this way we can define predicate equality at base types as
for σ ∈ { B , N } and further at higher types, extensionally as usual
It is straightforward to prove by induction on ρ that = ρ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive at any type ρ . To complete our system, we include in NA also the compatibility (i.e., extensionality) axiom CmpAx, see Table  1 . Note that ex falso quodlibet ( EFQ ) ⊥ → A and stability ( Stab ) ¬ ¬ A → A are fully provable in NA (cf. [35] , by induction on the logical structure of A , using TAx and Ind B ) .
TAx : 
for ⋄ ∈ { ∅ , + , − } Light formulas F l are built over usual formulas F of NA by adding the three light universal quantifiers: the non-computational ∀ ∅ and the two semi-computational ∀ + and ∀ − . 9 Thus, system NA l refines the adaptation of NA (with CMP for CmpAx and C l for C) with introduction and elimination rules for the light quantifiers (see Table 3 ). These are copies of the regular ND rules ∀ e and ∀ i , but with the usual restriction on ∀ i that z FV ( Γ ) enhanced with the following conditions referring to the LD -interpretation of Γ ⊢ l A :
(+) at the ∀ Notice that the restrictions (+), (−) and ( ∅ ) assume knowledge of the LD -interpretation of whole proofs, in their full depth, thus forcing the definition of NA l proofs to go inductively in parallel with the LD -extraction of part of their computational content (namely free variables of the extracted terms).
We simultaneously define the classes of realization irrelevant A ⊕ and refutation irrelevant A ⊖ formulas as follows (cf. Definition 1 in Section 2 of [17] ; below ⊔ denotes no thing ) :
One necessary change when adopting principles from NA is to replace CmpAx with a weak compatibility rule. This is because Dialectica is unable to interpret full extensionality (cf. [18, 39] ). We thus employ an upgraded variant of the T -polymorphic CMP rule from [13] :
where all formulas in Γ ⊖ are refutation irrelevant .
Remark 1 (Contraction).
The computationally irrelevant contractions in NA l can safely be handled implicitly at → i . The situation is different for those contractions whose formula is refutation relevant (i.e., the computationally relevant contractions), as we wanted to automatically ensure that their translation is decidable (instead of leaving the task of decidability check to the user). The decidability of their translation is necessary for attaining soundness.
We achieved this by including in NA l the contraction anti-rule C l (see Table 4 ) for all formulas A that are refutation relevant and (⋆) do not contain any ∀ + , nor ∀ ∅ . This triggered the addition to NA of an explicit (unrestricted) contraction anti-rule C which is needed in the construction of the verifying proof (it only applies to quantifier-free formulas | A | ). The restriction ⋆ ensured that all contraction formulas that require at least one challenger term for their LD -interpretation would have quantifier-free (hence decidable) LD -translations.
For the (light) modal Dialectica we upgrade this purely syntactical criterion used in [17] (as inherited from [13] ), see Remark 3 at the end of Section 3 .
Moreover, in order to avoid having any computationally relevant contractions implicitly at → i , we constrain the deduction rules of NA l to disallow multiple occurrences of refutation relevant assumptions in any of the premise sequents. Thus, whenever a double occurrence of a refutation relevant assumption is created in a conclusion sequent by one of the binary rules of NA l , such sequent cannot be directly a premise for the application of an(other) NA l rule: the anti-rule C l must be applied first, in order to eliminate the critical double.
If ⋆ is not satisfied and yet a : A is a refutation relevant assumption occurring at least twice in some conclusion sequent, this is a dead end: such sequent can only be the root of the NA l proof-(sub)tree.
While EFQ : ⊥ → A remains fully provable also in NA l (for all formulas A ∈ F l ) the situation changes for Stab : ¬ ¬ A → A in the case of many formulas A that feature light quantifiers in certain places. As noted in [13] , the usual proof in NA of Stab (constructed by induction on A) makes unavoidably use of contractions over ¬¬(B ∧ C) for subformulas (B ∧ C) of A , and these are subject to the ⋆ restriction for refutation relevant B ∧ C . Even when such B ∧ C obey ⋆, they may lead to the failure of restrictions (+), (−) or ( ∅ ). On the other hand Stab is provable in NA l for A ∈ F or A conjunction-free.
The light Dialectica interpretation (LD -interpretation)
With each formula A of NA l we associate its LD -translation: a not necessarily quantifier-free formula | A | 
Definition 1 (light Dialectica translation of formulas, as introduced in [17]).

The interpretation does not change atomic formulas, i.e., | at
( t B ) | :≡ at ( t B ) . Assuming | A | x y and | B | u v are already defined, | A ∧ B | x , u y , v :≡ | A | x y ∧ | B | u v and | A → B | f , g x , v :≡ | A | x f x v → | B | g x v .
The interpretation of the four universal quantifiers is (upon renaming, we assume that quantified variables occur uniquely in a formula): [ note that cf. Definition 2 in Section
The length and types of the witnessing and challenging tuples are uniquely determined for a given formula.
The following metatheorem gives the general pattern in which soundness theorems for Dialectica-based interpretations can be expressed, in a Natural Deduction setting. Here the metavariables ISys and VSys stand for input and respectively verifying systems. . . , a n : A n ⊢ l A 0 is provable in ISys , then terms t 0 , . . . , t n can be automatically synthesized from its formal proof, such that the translated sequent
is provable in VSys , and the following free variable condition (c) holds:
. Here x 0 , . . . , x n are tuples of fresh variables, such that equal avars share a common such tuple.
In [17] the above was thoroughly proved for ISys ≡ NA l and VSys ≡ NA , except for the interpretation of the weak extensionality rule, which we present below. Further in the sequel we also give a much more detailed treatment of the induction rule for numbers, in order to motivate the introduction of the modal induction rule in Section 4.1 .
Light Dialectica treatment of extensionality
We here give the LD -interpretation of the weak compatibility rule
where all formulas from Γ ⊖ are refutation irrelevant, i.e., the negative position in their LD -translation is empty. By definition of equality at higher types, s = ρ r is ∀ z . s z = r z , hence a purely universal formula. We are given that
, A 0 is s = ρ r and x 0 corresponds to z , thus the above is more conveniently rewritten as
To this we can apply the generalization rule, as x 0 are not free in the translated context | Γ ⊖ | . Indeed, x 0 are fresh variables and they could have appeared free only via terms t 1 , . . . , t n , were these not empty tuples (hence the need for restricting the original context). We thus obtain | Γ ⊖ | ⊢ s = r and further apply the extensionality Axiom to get
Note that the axiom is required here, as | Γ ⊖ | may contain general formulas. With g :≡ λ u . u and f :≡ λ u , v . v we have thus constructed a verifying proof
The new realizing terms f , g are closed, hence the free variable condition trivially holds. Note that f and g may at most depend on the type ρ ( they do not depend on concrete terms s , r ) , see also the first example in Section 4.2 .
Light Dialectica treatment of induction for natural numbers
Since the induction rule (for naturals) corresponds to an unbounded number of contractions of each assumption from the step context ∆ (cf. [13] , see Table 5 ), its clone in the system NA l is subject to a restriction like the one of C l . Namely, we need to require that all refutation relevant avars in ∆ satisfy ⋆.
Moreover, since the contractions on a ∈ Γ ∩ ∆ will be handled differently than for simple binary rules like → e or ∧ i , it is more convenient to require that naturals induction in NA l implicitly contracts all its refutation relevant assumptions (instead of using the explicit C l ). We will use the notation Γ ⊎ ∆ for a special multiset union in which refutation relevant assumptions appear only once, even if they appear in both Γ and ∆ . Thus the Ind N l rule of NA l is finally obtained by replacing ' Γ , ∆ ' with ' Γ ⊎ ∆ ' in the conclusion sequent of Ind N .
We are given
and
We show that
is a theorem of NA , where
for every corresponding pair r ∈ r / s ∈ s and ζ [n] will be constructed as functional terms depending on v . We here intentionally use the same variable n that occurs freely in s and t . Implicitly, just t
. Also ζ will be constructed as the collection of all ζ ′ (corresponding to Γ \ ∆ ) and ζ ′′ (corresponding to ∆ ). Let b : B be a refutation relevant avar in Γ ⊎ ∆ . Let γ ′ ∈ γ and / or δ ′ ∈ δ be the challengers for b in Γ and / or ∆ . If b appears only in Γ (hence not in ∆ ) we define
If b appears in ∆ , then the decidability of | B | is needed at each recursive step to equalize the terms p ( t t ′ v ) obtained by the recursive call with the corresponding terms δ ′ . Thus the right stop point of the backwards construction is provided. In fact an implicit contraction over b happens at each inductive step and
and for b ∈ ∆ \ Γ we define its ζ ′′ [ n ] by replacing in ( 7 ) the γ ′ with canonical zeros. Here z ′ are the challenge 9 variables corresponding to formula B . Notice that
We attempt to extend ( 9 ) to the whole ζ by proving from ( 10 ) the following
We obtain this as an immediate consequence of
, by ( 10) we get ζ
and thus ( 12) follows via Stab (which is fully available in the verifying system). We now prove ( 4 ) by an assumptionless induction on n . Let ζ * be the collection of all ζ ′ and those ζ
which follows from ( 2 ) since by definition ( 5 ) we have ⊢ t ′ [ 0 ] = r and by definitions ( 6 ) and ( 7 ) we have ⊢ ζ
. Now given ( 4 ) we want to prove
To ( 4 ) we apply ∀
and via easy deductions in NA we get
With ( 9 ) and ( 11 ) we can rewrite ( 14 ) to
In ( 3 ) we substitute x → t ′ [n] and get
which gives ( 13 ) by means of easy NA deductions using (8) , ( 12 ) and (15) .
Motivation for the modal induction rule
We have treated the most general situation, with all context sets Γ \ ∆ , Γ ∩ ∆ and ∆ \ Γ inhabited by refutation relevant assumptions, and conclusion formula A accepting both witnesses and challengers. Many particular situations amount to easier treatments, with simpler extracted terms. These can be obtained as simplifications of the general witnesses and challengers presented above, by means of the reduction properties of the empty tuple, which was denoted ǫ in [35] . We outline below only those particular cases which are relevant in connection with the modal induction rule Ind m N (cf. Section 4.1 further in the sequel) :
• If Γ ∪ ∆ contains no refutation relevant assumption, but A(n) is refutation relevant, then terms t are no part of the realizers for the conclusion sequent, in this case only t ′ . Hence t would be redundantly produced and a mechanism is needed to prevent their construction. This is ensured by in front of the step A(n) at Ind m N .
• If A(n) is refutation relevant, ∆ has no refutation relevant element but Γ is refutation relevant inhabited, then δ and ζ ′′ are empty. Yet ζ * ≡ ζ ′ has to be produced as (6) and includes t [n] ; this no longer will be the case for Ind m N (cf. technical details at the end of Section 4.1 further in the sequel; challengers γ simply are preserved for | Γ | ) .
• If A(n) is refutation irrelevant then v , t and t t ′ v are empty tuples. Thus ζ ′ ≡ γ ′ and ( 7 ) simplifies to
Intermezzo
In [37] , the second author thoroughly presented how Gödel's Dialectica interpretation can be completely deconstructed from its full computational essence down to a symbolic null transformation (see also Chapter 5 of [38] for a more comprehensive exposition, in particular Section 5.5.1, page 129). However, the flag apparatus for decorating 10 both quantifiers and implications (throughout the input proofs) tends to become too complex for human operators (so that Oliva's detour to the linear logic substructure may appear as a better alternative).
We here propose a middle path between removing computational content of ('computationally correct') proofs via the second author's "deep annotation" mechanism and Oliva's "shallow annotation" equivalent approach (see Section 6 of [37] ). We will thus use (a single switch) directly at the level of natural proofs. Although cannot be simulated within our previous light Dialectica (hence is a strict addition to our previous light Arithmetic), it certainly is implementable within either of Trifonov's or Oliva's systems.
The purpose of our approach has been the rapid implementation in the actual MinLog system (cf. [34] , in particular the 'Gödel's Dialectica interpretation' subsection of 'Computational content of classical proofs'). Indeed, was implemented (in [34] ) as "syntactic sugar" over the 'non-computational' implication −−> seen as Kreisel implication.
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By abuse of notation, in the sequel we will use the same 'proof gates' ⊢ and ⊢ l as in the prequel, only now in the new modal setting, as the actual affiliation of a formal (sub)proof is easily deducible from the meta-context. This includes the deduction rules from the tables in Section 1.2 , for which the constraints (that are outlined below each table) smoothly adapt to the insertion of (into the input system NA l , through i and AxT), as described in the sequel. [ Our modal systems are normal according to the definition from [9] , and non-standard since the normality scheme AxK is (syntactically) derivable from the axiom (scheme) AxT . ] For the necessity operator we have the following enhanced introduction rule, which admits many more premise sequents than usual ( as the context Γ may be inhabited, see also Remark 4 in Section 4 for an extended motivation ):
where Γ is restricted depending on the (light) modal translation of the proof of A from Γ , in a way that is akin to the condition (+) on the ∀ i + rule from page 6 ; see Definition 3 further below. The following axioms of modal propositional logic S 4 ( cf. [33] , Chapter VII; see also Chapter 9 of [40] ) are part of NA m and NA m l :
In fact only AxT is needed as axiom of our non-standard modal systems. Of course, AxT c and Ax4 c had been syntactically deducible from AxT and respectively Ax4 already in the propositional modal system S 4 , only using minimal logic ( the proof of Ax4 c also uses AxK and the empty-context i ). It turns out that also Ax4 and AxK are easily deducible in NA m / NA m l just from AxT (and only using minimal logic), given our very liberal necessity introduction rule, see Definition 3 below. Note that Stability ¬ ¬ B → B needs to be restricted already for NA m , due to the necessary restriction on Contraction, see Remark 3 in the sequel and Remark 5 in Section 4 .
We denote by A → k B :≡ A → B the so called 'Kreisel implication' 12 , since its translation by (light) modal Dialectica is akin to its Modified Realizability interpretation. Basically, if A is a formula in which all implications are Kreisel ones, then the modal Dialectica interpretation of A is logically equivalent (provably in NA ) to the modified realizability interpretation of A ; see Lemma 3.2 of [26] and also [29] .
Note that even though our Kreisel implication looks similar to the so-called 'lax implication' (cf. [30] -Section 7), here we are not concerned with a standard (intuitionistic) modal logic (see Remark 5 at the end of Section 4 ). Ditto for the (classical) translation of under the Curry-Howard-style 'modal functional interpretation' of De Queiroz and Gabbay (cf. [7] , see also Section 7 of [6] for an updated survey) . 
Definition 2 (modal Dialectica interpretation -translation of formulas). The interpretation does not change atomic
As an immediate consequence ,
and further
which we can compare
Definition 3 (Necessity Introduction).
The restriction on i is relative to programs synthesized from the proof of the premise A of this Natural Deduction rule , unless all formulas in the context Γ are refutation irrelevant or A is refutation irrelevant . Namely , with Γ ≡ { a 1 : A 1 , . . . , a n : A n } and A ≡ A 0 , the restriction is that Note that could be defined in terms of → k as A ≡ (A → k ⊥) → ⊥ , since NA features full stability Stab.
Definition 4 (light modal Dialectica translation of formulas). The following are added to the above Definition 2 ( the deduced translation of ∃ ∅ z is outlined below for use at the end of Section 4.2 ; cf. 2nd paragraph of Section 5 ) :
The light modal translation of formulas only adds | A | x :≡ ∀y | A | x y to our light functional translation from [17] .
The definition of computational relevance of (light) modal formulas A is basically the same as for non-modal formulas, but relative to the enhanced syntactic context. Namely, A is realization relevant also under (light) modal Dialectica if the tuple of witness variables x of its translation | A |
x y is not empty and similarly A is refutation relevant if the tuple of challenge variables y is not empty. (See Remark 1 in Section 3 of [17]). Correspondingly, A is realization irrelevant if it is not realization relevant (i.e., x is an empty tuple), and A is refutation irrelevant if it is not refutation relevant (i.e., y is an empty tuple). [ See also the more technical definition in Section 1.2 ]
Remark 2 (restriction violation for i ).
In an automatized interactive search for modal input proofs of some given specification, we can temporarily allow unrestricted (or lesser restricted) instances of i and postpone the validity check for when the proof of its premise is fully constructed. This approach would be similar to the 'nc-violations' check in the actual MinLog system, see [35] , and to the so-called 'computationally correct proofs' from [38] .
For efficiency reasons, we recommend the use of modal operators whenever possible instead of the above partly (or non) computational quantifiers ∀ + , ∀ − , ∀ ∅ and ∃ ∅ .Thus it makes sense to study the (pure) modal Dialectica in itself, as the use of such light quantifiers may not be necessary in many cases of interest.It should be easier to construct a purely modal (i.e., without light quantifiers) input proof, also for a (semi) automated proof-search algorithm.
Nevertheless, it is the light variant of modal Dialectica which provides the larger range of possibilities, particularly for situations where the simpler, 'heavier' modal Dialectica would not suffice.
Remark 3 (Contraction restriction).
We upgrade the ⋆ restriction from [17] on the computationally relevant contractions (those on refutation relevant open assumptions A), such that the interpretation | A | must be decidable (rather than strictly quantifier-free).In the new modal context one needs to take into account also the translation of the necessity operator, as this introduces new quantifiers. These may alter the decidability of the translated formula (relative to the corresponding non-modal formula obtained by wiping out all instances of ) .
E.g., let T (x, y, z) be a decidable predicate such that H(x, y) :≡ ∃ z T (x, y, z) is not decidable [ e.g., take Kleene's T predicate which is expressible in Peano Arithmetic, hence also in NA , so that H expresses the Halting Problem "program with code x halts on input y" ]. Then P(x) :≡ ∀y ∀z ¬ T (x, y, z) can be a contraction formula, whereas P (x) :≡ ∀y ∀z ¬ T (x, y, z) cannot, as its translation is ∀z ¬ T (x, y, z) , an undecidable formula, since
On the other hand, both ∀z (3z x) ∧ ∀y (2y x) and ∀z (3z x) ∧ ∀y (2y x) can be contraction formulas, as ∀y (2y x) is decidable. Thus, given that there is no generic algorithm for the decidability of first-order formulas over N , the user needs to supply a boolean term and a proof that the respective term is equivalent to the translation of the contraction formula. E.g., add ∀y (2y x) ↔ at (Odd(x)) as global assumption (cf. [34] ), see also Footnote 13 .
Modal and light modal functional interpretations
Below we prove that (meta-) Theorem 1 ( see Section 2 on page 8 ) remains valid also for the pairs [ NA m , NA ] (modal Dialectica) and [ NA m l , NA ] (light modal Dialectica) , which share the same VSys ≡ NA . Recall from Definition 3 of i that the (generic) restriction on the premise sequent is that
. This ensures that the introduction rule ∀ i can be applied for variables x 0 and thus the conclusion sequent a 1 : A 1 , . . . , a n : A n ⊢ l A 0 is witnessed by exactly the same realizers as those constructed for the premise sequent Γ ⊢ l A 0 . 
Lemma 1 (interpretation of S 4 modal axioms). Axioms
Proof: The translation of AxT is
and we can take g to be the identity
and we can take f to be the projection λ x y . y . For Ax4 and Ax4 c it is immediate that | A | ≡ | A | and also | A | ≡ | A | , thus the realizer is again the identity in both cases. In the translation of AxK below, we take U :≡ λ f , g , x . g x , which can easily be proved to be a realizer.
Given the above Lemma and comments, we have completely established the following:
Theorem 2 (soundness of modal Dialectica
). Theorem 1 [ NA m , NA ] .
Theorem 3 (soundness of light modal Dialectica
The next result pictures the actual limits of our modal adaptation of Gödel's functional interpretation.
Theorem 4 ( T− unrealizability of S 5 defining axiom). Axiom Ax5 : A → A is not realizable (in general) under the (light) modal Dialectica translation (by primitive recursive functionals of finite type).
Proof: The translation of Ax5 is a formula of shape B( x) → ∀ y B( y) which only holds true for minor particular cases (e.g., when x is the empty tuple, special case when Ax5 requires no realizer at all).
Notice that ∃ x A is akin to Berger's uniform existence {∃ x} A from [2] , where one does not care about the witness for ∃ x (which is actually deleted from the extraction). We can thus see as an extension of Berger's appliance to more general formulas than just existential ones.
On the other hand there are situations when and are too general contrivances and separate annotations for each quantifier are a better answer for the problem at hand. In some of these cases it may still be possible to use the modal operators if one changes the input specification and its proof.
Remark 4 (Necessity Introduction revisited).
The propositional restriction on the introduction rule for the necessity operator is that all contextual assumptions had been discharged prior to the rule application (which would amount to forcing Γ ≡ ∅ at our i ). In the natural deduction presentation of standard modal logic, i cannot be unrestricted or A → A becomes a theorem, thus all occurrences of becoming redundant. Our restriction on i is strictly weaker, as, e.g., allows any context Γ whose formulas are all refutation irrelevant (this is akin to Prawitz's 'first version' in [31] VI. §1) and any context at all if the conclusion is refutation irrelevant. Thus, A → A not only is more generally possible in our quantified modal systems, it even defines a quite interesting class of formulas, see below.
Definition 5 (necessary formulas). Formulas
Also due to AxT, it follows that ⊢ A ↔ A for any necessary formula, thus placing in front of such A would be logically redundant (this is akin to Prawitz's "essentially modal" formulas in [31] VI. §2, 'second version').
We say that an occurrence of is meaningful (i.e., non-redundant) in front of any formula that is not necessary. Note that all refutation irrelevant formulas are necessary formulas. It is easy to see that some of the refutation relevant formulas are necessary, e.g., ∀ x ⊥ and ∀ x ⊤ (in fact any A s.t. ⊢ A or ⊢ ¬ A in NA m or NA m l ). However, even if such formulas syntactically do require challengers, these functionals turn out to be redundant and can be soundly discarded by a , without the need to change any other component of the input proof. In fact, a formula A is necessary iff it can be proved equivalent (in NA m or NA m l ) to a refutation irrelevant formula B. Indeed, for a necessary A take B :≡ A . For the converse we can use the long implication A → B → B → A , where for the last implication a contextless i together with AxK was used. [ see also [31] VI. §2 for modally closed formulas ] Therefore, the 'necessary' class captures those formulas whose negative computational content can always be erased regardless of the context in which they are used. On the other hand, there are cases when can soundly be applied to a non-necessary formula, leading to cleaner (and thus better) extracted programs (see Section 4.2 below).
Remark 5 (non-standard modal).
It would appear that our Arithmetic NA m is able to prove new modal theorems and even sentences that are invalid in Schütte's semantics. On the other hand, our ⋆ restriction is not present in the usual first-order modal logic systems, thus some of the classical modal theorems will no longer be theorems of NA
m . Yet we suspect we are not far from Prawitz's VI. §4 'fourth version' for C ′ S5 with discharge function for normalization. The Barcan formula ∀z A(z) → ∀z A(z) is inadmissible in our modal systems (it is T-unrealizable in general, similar to Ax5); although invalid in Schütte's S ⋆ 4 (cf. Anmerkung at the end of [33] .I. §3), it is provable in Prawitz's C S5 for modally closed A (see page 78 of [31] VI. §2). However, the Converse Barcan formula ∀z A(z) → ∀z A(z) is admissible (it is bluntly realizable, similiar to AxT). We thus suspect that some form of an increasing domain semantics will be suitable for our systems; see Sections 2.5 and 2.9 of [5] .
Modal induction rule
As first argued in [16] , induction (for natural numbers, but more generally also for lists, as naturals N are a particular case of inductively defined lists) should rather be treated in a Modified Realizability style whenever possible under Dialectica extraction. In our non-standard modal context we can introduce the following modal induction rule of systems NA m and NA m l , which is defined with a Kreisel implication at the step:
This is an upgrade of the similar rule from [16] (given at the linear logic level, see also [28] ), as it allows for nonempty contexts. While the base context Γ is unrestricted, the step context ∆ is made entirely of refutation irrelevant assumptions of shape D. Thus the step context restriction as for Ind N l (see Section 2.2) is bluntly satisfied, since this only concerned refutation relevant assumptions (whose translations in NA had to be quantifier-free, as their decidability was needed for case distinction in their corresponding challenge realizers). Note that if D already is refutation irrelevant, placing in front of D is somewhat redundant. We could refine Ind for situations when the whole context is made entirely of refutation irrelevant assumptions but A(n) is a refutation relevant formula. The challenger for A(n) in the step conclusion would be unneededly produced during the treatment of such Ind 
Modal induction rule -technical details
We are given both the following
′ ) from the latter we easily obtain
With t [ n ] :≡ R n r ( λ n . s ) for every corresponding pair r ∈ r / s ∈ s we show by induction on n in NA with base context | Γ | u γ and step context | ∆ | z that
As t [ 0 ] ≡ r the base is given by (16) and the step follows from (17) Remark 6. Our modal induction rule is equivalent to a special case of Ind N , since a can be placed in front of A(S n) from the step sequent of Ind m N . The equivalence of the two formulations for the step sequent can easily be proved using AxT , Ax4 , AxK and i . Extracted terms are the same and the verifying proof only gets more direct.
Past examples revisited
The weak extensionality of modal input systems NA m and NA m l can better be expressed by means of the following modal compatibility axiom (the usual compatibility axiom, but with the outward implication changed to a Kreisel implication; see also the Introduction of [28] for the akin formulation in linear logic using a 'Kreisel modality' ! k )
By straightforward calculations, it is easy to see that CmpAx m is realizable under (light) modal Dialectica by simple projection functionals, with the verification in the fully extensional NA given by the corresponding compatibility axiom CmpAx. The realizing terms are same f , g as for CMP ρ at the end of Section 2.1 , here just grouped in tuples.
In [16] the following class of examples was considered: theorems of the form
possibly with parameters, where the negative information on x is irrelevant, while the one on y is of our interest. Then it must be possible to adapt the proof of (18) to a proof in NA m or NA m l of ( ∀ x A ) → ∀ y B → ∀ z C . As noticed by Oliva in [28] , the Fibonacci example first treated with Dialectica in [14] falls into this category.
Oliva also suggested an interesting example, which motivated the definition of our positively computational quantifier ∀ + ( see Definition 1 and also Definition 4 ): "Any infinite set P of natural numbers (with decidable membership) contains elements which are arbitrarily far apart". The claim can be formalized (in an extension of NA with proper predicate symbols) as follows:
This statement can be proved only via a contraction on the premise, and as a result (the negative universally quantified) x gets refuted by a term involving case distinction on | P | . However, if only the witnesses of n 1 and n 2 are needed, then the redundant challenge for x can simply be discarded by means of a in front of the premise, effectively applying a Kreisel implication. This example is of the form (18) and was extensively treated in Section 4 of [17] . It can even be treated with the hybrid Dialectica from [16] ; here we only bring the more instrumental solution.
The example can be extended so that the premise becomes more involved (cf. [38] , Example 5.3 on page 114):
Again, a contraction must be used, and two semi-computational quantifiers need to be applied in order to erase the negative computational content. The light specification corresponding to (19) would then be written as:
However, this solution is not desirable, as the light annotations would only apply to a special class of binary relations Q for which the witness n 1 for Q(n 1 , S m) does not depend computationally on the witness n for Q(n, m) for any m , hence reducing the generality of the claim. One of the solutions would be to extend the light annotations to implications as in [38] . However, a much simpler and more elegant approach is to use a Kreisel implication, by placing a in front of ∀m ∃ n Q(n, m) → ∃ n 1 Q(n 1 , S m) at (19) . The negative content of the main premise will thus be fully erased and the positive one will be fully preserved, achieving a Modified Realizability effect. We also treat an artificial proof for the 'integer root example' (first considered in [3] ): "every unbounded integer function has an integer root function". The statement can be formalized (in negative arithmetics) as follows:
The claim can be proved by contradiction using n-induction for the formula f (n) ≤ m . However, in addition to computing the integer root, the (heavy) Dialectica also extracts a complex recursive counterexample for x , with a case distinction on each step (cf. [38] , section 3.2). This term challenges the outermost premise ∀x ∃ y ( f (y) > x ) which actually constitutes the refutation relevant context shared by both the base and the step formulas of the induction.
The undesired negative content can be erased by 'Kreisel-izing' the outermost implication of (20) , thus converting the context to a necessary one, hence allowing for the application of the modal induction rule. As a result, only the integer root gets synthesized ( the realizer for n as function of m ) and additional artifacts are omitted. Note that, in contrast to the previous two examples, this proof is intrinsically classical, so Modified Realizability alone is not applicable in this case. However, using ∀ + x would still achieve the same cleaning effect (cf. [38] , section 5.6.1) .
Conclusion
Proof that is a strict addition to the light system
where K is the witness varible and f, g are challenge variables. Such specification cannot be produced by means of light quantifier decorations of the schemata
Below is the small MinLog program that was used to carry out the modal translation; the raw MinLog output has been processed for readability. [ e.g., @@ binds a (long) pair of types ]
(load "C:\\minlog\\initDan.scm") ; initial system load, adapted to Windows pathnames (load "C:\\minlog\\etsmd.scm") ; library for modal Dialectica that adapts src/etsd.scm (libload "nat.scm") ; library for naturals that also defines n, m, k of type 'nat' (add-predconst-name "A" "B" (make-arity (py "nat") (py "nat"))) (add-predconst-name "C" (make-arity (py "nat"))) ; no computational vars for predconsts ;; (add-variable "f" "g" (py "((nat=>nat)=>nat=>nat)")) ;; (add-variable "h" (py "nat=>nat")) ; below 'F' is MinLog's decidable falsum (define oG (pf "(all n ex m A m n -> all n ex m B m n) --> (all k C k -> F) ")) (define mdoG (formula-to-md-formula oG)) ; (pretty-print mdoG) ; (add-variable "K" (py "(((nat=>nat)=>nat=>nat)@@((nat=>nat)=>nat=>nat)=>nat)")) ;;; ex K all f,g { all h,n [ A(h (g h n) , g h n) -> B(f h n, n) ] -> C (K f g) -> F }
Illustrative example: finitary Infinite Pigeonhole Principle
As refreshed case study, let us consider the Infinite Pigeonhole Principle (cf. [32] ). In his PhD thesis (cf. Chapter 5 of [38] , in particular Section 5.6.2) the second author explains that three uniform quantifiers need to be inserted in order to remove the negative computational content from three universally quantified formulas inside the proof 14 . It turns out that this can be achieved by inserting a single in the formulation of the corollary he is proving (Unbounded Pigeonhole Principle). [ in front of the conjunction Decr(l, n)∧ Same(l, n) , see Corollary 3.6 on page 63 of [38] ]
The treatment of the example now becomes simpler, with the same extracted term displayed by Trifonov in his thesis. The advantage of modal Dialectica is that in the proof one only needs to check the uniformity condition once for the ( logically pushed in front of Decr(l, n)∧ Col(l, n) from the intermediate lemma ) rather than two times for ∀ ∅ introductions. The paradigm here is that one can outline the optimizations "en masse" rather than piece by piece.
Note that the program (manually) extracted by Trifonov basically is the same as the one described by Kohlenbach in Section 11.4 of [19] by means of Oliva's finite bar recursion, cf. Section 2.1 of [25] . The first author carried out the implementation in MinLog by means of the Kreisel implication and automatically obtained the bettered Scheme program from Figure 5 .3 of [38] . 15 14 Note that the program in Figure 5 .3 of [38] is a hand-compiled version of the expression of Table 5 .3. I.e., they denote one and the same program, but in Table 5 .3 the extraction of the term is shown in a stepwise manner, so that every step can be related to the proof and to the interpretation. Figure 5 .3 represents an operationally cleaner Scheme program. There is no normalization happening between Table 5 .3 and Figure  5 .3: Trifonov avoided it, as (uncontrolled) normalization can produce a slower program. 15 At the moment of writing, the MinLog implementation of ∀ ∅ is not completely operational for proofs involving case distinction (for naturals) like the one produced by the second author for comparison with the (sleeker for the finitary pigeonhole principle) A-translation approach. The first author rearranged the input specification so that two → can be rewritten as → k , otherwise the input proof essentially is the same as Trifonov's.
Modal Dialectica provides the means of using both Modified Realizability and Gödel's Dialectica at the same time for more efficient program extraction. This was already the case for the hybrid Dialectica of [16] , but here we avoid the detour to the linear logic substructure. Disregarding the light quantifiers, modal Dialectica represents (directly at the supra-linear level) a good combination of the original proof interpretations, with the possibility of carrying out both in a sound way on certain input proofs, insofar as some implications of the input specification can be 'Kreisel-ized'. At the extreme, Modified Realizability is obtained from Dialectica, see also the comments above Definition 2 . E.g., (21) Why not invoke a Modified Realizability (MR) extraction procedure for B → C instead of processing B → k C ? Per se, MR requires strong existential quantification; even in combination with (refined) A-translation (cf. [4] ), restrictions are in place for the shape of the goal formula. Thus it is modal Dialectica that provides the fully modular approach. E.g., the Dialectica extracted term from the (classical) proof of IPP (Infinite Pigeonhole Principle) can be (re)used further in the synthesis of programs that employ IPP as lemma (such as the Unbounded Pigeonhole Principle).
Future investigative directions
A natural continuation of the work reported in this paper concerns the addition to our input systems of strong (intuitionistic) elements. Besides the strong ∃ and its light associated ∃ ∅ (originally from [13] where it was denoted ∃ , see also [38] ), strong possibility also needs to be considered as the intuitionistic dual of necessity .
The following clauses would then be added to Definition 2 for getting the strong modal Dialectica interpretation Intuitionistic (light) modal arithmetical systems will first be considered at input for 'strong' program synthesis. Then their enhanced classical counterparts will be interpreted, modulo some negative translation. Such systems will soundly extend NA m with and ∃ , and NA m l also with ∃ ∅ . Nevertheless, certain restrictions may need to be applied on NA m and / or NA m l before attempting such extensions with intuitionistic elements. ( See, e.g., [36] , in particular Chapters 4 and 7 for an intuitionistic account of intuitionistic modal logic. )
In section 3.2 of [28] Oliva suggested labelled contexts in order to deal with the technical difficulties of having both the Kreisel and the usual (Gödel) implications in intuitionistic logic IL ω . Our implementation in MinLog of → k identifies those "Kreisel" assumptions as the ones discharged at −−> introduction; they are marked so that no realizer is extracted for their negative side. In the modal language, we can say that they are "boxed" by means of , which acts as a "Kreisel" label. The restriction from Definition 3 then has to be checked for the proof of the premise of an −−> elimination. It is straightforward that the hybrid system with → k is fully expressible in NA m ; the question is whether NA m could nicely be expressed in a system with the Kreisel implication as primitive, given that | A | ↔ NA | (A → k ⊥) → ⊥ | . Perhaps a Kreisel negation ¬ k were more suitable, with | ¬ k A | ↔ NA | (A → k ⊥) | .
Last but not least, the design of the monotone variant of modal Dialectica is under consideration, since it has been known for some time that a (heterogeneous) combination of modified realizability and classical Dialectica was successfully used by Leuştean for proof mining ( cf. [19] ) an exceptional approximation result in metric fixed-point theory ( cf. [21, 22] ). ( See also [15] for a synthetic analysis of the impact of the precursor of into Kohlenbach's advanced framework for Proof Mining ; note that our base logical framework is equivalent to the one used by the proof miners, cf. Section 1.1.11 of [39] , see also [23] n12 max f14 n15)))max f10 n11))) n8) (right y7 n8)]))])) >
